Document Type
Article
Comments
Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System (with David D. Haddock), 1985 University of Illinois Law Review 315 (1985)
Abstract
Deregulation, much like regulation itself, is a rational political response to pressure from discrete economic groups that benefit from such deregulation. Such pressures explain many, if not all, of the actions and inactions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to implementing a national market system in the United States. For example, Gregg Jarrell, the chief economist at the SEC, recently relied upon such a "political support theory," to explain the SEC's abolition of fixed-rate commissions on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Date of Authorship for this Version
1985
Recommended Citation
Macey, Jonathan R. and Haddock, David D., "Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System" (1985). Faculty Scholarship Series. 1767.
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1767