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The life of the law has not been logic; it has not been experience
either. It has involved "logic," of course, if the word is taken to signify
some system of order in terms of which mere experience has meaning.
And its subject matter, the interaction among people and between them
and the world, certainly can fairly be called "experience." But the law's
life has never been one or the other: instead, it is and has always been
an attempt to create and maintain a coherent species of "logic" that
would not too ridiculously fail to reflect, or even refract, experience.'
It has been, in short, an attempt to construct a legal system that accommodates
the equally exigent demands of being and meaning, and
to do so in a universe in which what a thing does is only one of the
things that it means, but everything that it means is something else that
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