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A critic's judgment can have but little worth for his readers unless they know his point of view. Let me, then, confess at once that with much in this book I agree, because some ideas previously expressed in my own writings resemble some of Morgenthau's. That perhaps will explain why (despite what I consider its glaring faults) I recommend this volume as a valuable antidote to the pernicious pseudo-rationalism of many so-called social scientists and many legal thinkers. However, just because I agree with Morgenthau to a considerable extent, I regret, and urgently warn against, his (almost) wholesale rejection of the possibility of deliberately extending the power of human reason. He quotes Pascal, but he ignores Pascal's sage advice: "Two extremes: to exclude reason, to admit reason only." He gives too little attention to Graham Wallas' seminal idea that thought is not wholly different from the "natural impulses" or "dispositions" but ig itself a natural impulse or disposition, that there is an "emotion of thought."
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