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To the great and on-going public debate on the proper scope of judicial review, notable contributions have been forthcoming from two distinguished students of the Supreme Court who have, last year and this, delivered the annual Holmes Lecture at Harvard. The first of these contributions is Learned Hand's eloquent essay "The Bill of Rights." The second, partly responsive to Judge Hand and partly building upon him, is Herbert Wechsler's characteristically provocative and thoughtful paper, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law." In insisting on neutral constitutional adjudication, Professor Wechsler blueprints a sound theoretical structure of reasoned and dispassionate judicial review. But he singles out as prime examples of judicial unneutrality the major recent Supreme Court decisions in the field of race discrimination, culminating in the Court's consideration of segregation in the public schools. Because the decisions Professor Wechsler challenges doubtless comprise the most significant judicial restatement of our national policy in the past century, it seems important to consider whether the decisions are not in fact valid exercises of the power of judicial review.
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