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Both the law and economics of antitrust have undergone significant change
in the past twenty years. The expansive antitrust attitudes and enforcement
practices of the 1960s have been delimited. Greater respect for economies
and the subtleties of market processes and competition have developed. Efforts
to focus antitrust policy and further delimit antitrust enforcement are in progress. Although I am sympathetic with these general purposes, I am also concerned with overshooting. Part I of this article examines the changing attitudes toward antitrust and distinguishes between inflexible legal rule and more flexible legal process bases for delimiting enforcement. Part II assesses the "filters" approach to antitrust proposed by Frank Easterbrook,1 parts of which have been embraced
by the enforcement agencies and the courts. Part III sketches the scope of strategic behavior. Several recent cases in which filter and strategic behavior
issues arise are discussed in part IV.

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antitrust, filter, strategic behavior