Document Type
Article
Comments
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Consciousness of Guilt (with D. Slesinger), 77 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 725 (1929)
Abstract
In previous papers we discussed two aspects of state of
mind: (I) where it was used to prove an act in issue; I and (2)
where it was itself in issue. In order to discuss it scientifically
it was first necessary to dispose of linguistic differences between
modern psychology and the law, because of the attitude of the
former toward introspective studies of non-verifiable behavior.
After discovering what behavior was referred to by the legal
concept, that behavior was discussed in the light of recent psychological
study. It then appeared that state of mind to prove
an act and state of mind in issue were two different phenomena
which easily became confused because of the tendency to use a
single phrase to cover them both. Further analysis revealed that
the concept could profitably be broken up according to the use to
which the evidence was put in various cases. We finally concluded
that the phrase "state of mind" was dangerous principally
because of the inclination to regard it as a fact instead of looking
upon it as a middle term hypothetically connecting observable
behavior phenomena; and that as a phrase it is useful for getting
certain evidence before the jury, but not as a criterion of such
evidence.
Date of Authorship for this Version
1929
Recommended Citation
Hutchins, Robert M. and Slesinger, Donald, "Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Consciousness of Guilt" (1929). Faculty Scholarship Series. 4750.
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4750