On the Margin: Humanities and Law, 10 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 413 (1998)
Austin Sarat reminds us that law is part of "The Humanities" and that the study of law could be situated appropriately in a liberal arts college committed to the humanities. Yet given that law is humanities, it is poignant to consider how marginal the study of humanities is to law schools, which constitute one venue (but not the only, as Austin Sarat explains) in which law is taught.
A word of definition is needed. In his discussion here, Austin Sarat implicitly equates humanities with literary or critical studies and history, rather than a wider range of disciplines that embraces the social sciences. Given that Austin Sarat's own scholarship includes some of the most significant essays giving insights into law through social science methodology, I know his definitions are broader. But I will assume his focus and leave the debate about the category to another time. The more limited framing intersects with two of my own interests, for I teach and write about issues bearing the titles of "Law and Literature" and "Feminist Theories in Law." Each of these enterprises fits the point of marginality: Each sits in a corner of the curriculum of law schools, rather than occupying a space assumed to be the core.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Resnik, Judith, "On the Margin: Humanities and Law" (1998). Faculty Scholarship Series. 780.