This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
Date of Authorship for this Version
Parisi, Francesco; Schulz, Norbert; and Depoorter, Ben, "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons" (2003). John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers. 279.