In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on whether incentives generated by bank executives' compensation programs led to excessive risk-taking. Post-crisis, compensation reform proposals have taken broadly three approaches: long-term deferred equity incentive compensation, mandatory bonus clawbacks upon accounting restatements and financial losses, and debt-based compensation. In earlier articles we recommended the following compensation structure for bank executives: incentive compensation should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options - restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after his or her last day in office. We contend that this incentive compensation package, which we term the Restricted Equity proposal, will focus bank managers' attention on the long-run and discourage them from investing in high-risk, value-destroying projects.
Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano,
Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?,
Yale J. on Reg.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol31/iss3/3