An extensive literature has analyzed the accountability of administrative agencies, and in particular, their relationship to Congress. A well-established strand in the literature emphasizes that Congress retains control over agencies by their design, with a focus on the structure and process by which agency decisionmaking is undertaken. This Article examines the relationship between agency structure and decisionmaking across four agencies with similar statutory missions but different organizational structures: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), with a uniquely independent and controversial structure, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with more conventional independent commission structures.
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency Decisionmaking: Implications of the CFPB's Design for Administrative Guidance,
Yale J. on Reg.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol36/iss1/5